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TORT LIABILITY OF THE STATE:
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE
CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT
Harry Street*

ANGLO-AMERICAN legal systems have for so long lingered
behind the Continent of Europe in developing a satisfactory basis
of governmental civil liability that the enactment of the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946 1 in the United States, and the Crown Proceedings
Act of 1947 2 in Great Britain are events justifying a comparison and
evaluation of these belated attempts to provide the citizens with an
adequate remedy against the State.

I"\..

I
BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATION

A. Basis for Governmental Immunity from Suit
The rule in England that the king could never be sued in the courts
as were his subjects had its roots in feudalism. Just as no lord could
be sued in the court which he held to try the cases of his tenants, so
the king, at the apex of the feudal system, could not be sued in the
royal courts.8 Nevertheless, even in the thirteenth century it was
recognized that the king, as the fountain of justice, should redress
grievances when petitioned to do so by his subjects, and it became an
established rule that the subject could bring his petition of right, which,
if acceded to by the king, enabled the ordinary courts to give redress.
Judges in the :fifteenth century 4 were saying that petition of right
would not lie for a pure tort by the king, and this developed in the
sixteenth century into the theory that the king can do no wrong. This
notion "is probably to be associated with the growth of the prerogative,
the strengthening of the kingship, the ideas of divine right and of the
absolute sovereign." 5
It is important to recognize that these rules that the king is immune
* Faculty of Law,

Manchester University, Manchester, England.
60 Stat. L. 842, 28 U.S.C. (1946) § 921.
2
IO & II Geo. 6, c. 44.
8
See I PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 2d ed., 515-518
(1899); 9 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 8 (1926).
4
See Y.B. I Hen. 7 Mich. pl. 5, per Hussey, C.J.
5
Borchard, "Government Responsibility in Tort," 36 YALE L.J. I at 31 (1926).
1
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from suit and that he can do no wrong were entirely separate.6 Had
the effect of the latter maxim merely been confined to absolving the
king from liability for his personal torts, little harm would have been
done. However, the British courts later refused to apply the doctrine
of employers' liability to the Crown,7 asserting that the maxim that the
king can do no wrong had as a corollary that the king cannot authorize
wrong. The principles of vicarious liability were then imperfectly
understood, it being thought that the employer was liable because,
when he authorized the tort it was his tort. Had it been realized that
vicarious liability was a duty laid down by public policy analogous to
the duties imposed with various degrees of stringency on the owner of
things which are or may be sources of danger to others, then the rule
that only the individual public servant performing the act, and not his
employer, the Crown, was liable for his torts might have been avoided.
Until 1947, it was the rule of English law that a petition of right "will
lie when in consequence of what has been legally done any resulting
obligation emerges on behalf of the subject" 8 and that the main limitation on its availability was that it could not be used in respect of torts.
Why the English theory of sovereign immunity, in origin personal
to the king, came to be applied in the United States is one of the mysteries of .legal evolution. Clearly, in the United States the government
is not sovereign, but rather "sovereignty itself remains with the people
by whom and for whom all government exists and acts." 9 Indeed, the
first important United States Supreme Court case10 decided that the
doctrine of state immunity from suit was inconsistent with popular
sovereignty. This decision was most unpopular with the states, who
were heavily in debt after the Revolution, and, in consequence, the
Eleventh Amendment, prohibiting litigation in the federal courts by
a citizen of one state against another state, was passed.
Since Cohens v. Virginia 11 the courts have consistently held that
the government is immune from suit except by its own consent. Various
reasons have been assigned in support of the rule, the most common
6

Writers who do not so distinguish them, for example,

THE Doc45-46 (1910),
cannot explain why the petition of right was available for contract, but not for tort.
7
Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney General, 1 Phill. 306 (1842); Tobin v. The
Queen, 16 C.B.N.S. 3rn (1864); Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257 (1865).
8
Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 at 530.
9
YickWov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 at 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886).
1
°Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 (1793).
11
6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 (1821).
SINGEWALD,

TRINE OF NoN-SuABILITY OF THE STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
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one being that it "is a privilege of sovereignty.ni2 Mr. Justice Holmes
said: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends.ms A further justification has been that it
is "a policy imposed by necessity." 14 In United States v. Lee, after
a full historical investigation, the conclusion was reached "that it has
been adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists,
that the supreme power in every State, wherever it may reside, shall
not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to defend
itself from assaults in those courts.ni5 In Briggs v. Light-Boats, it was
said that "it would be inconsistent with th~ very idea of supreme executive power, and would endanger the performance of the public duties
of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a matter of right,
at the will of any citizen, and to submit to the judicial tribunals the
control and disposition of his public property, his instruments and
means of carrying on the government in war and peace, and the money
in his treasury." 16 Dean Pound bases the immunity on "a public
interest in the dignity of the political organization of society." 11
Governmental immunity from suit being firmly entrenched in
American law, a substitute remedy for the injured citizen had to be
found. Instead of the English method of a petition of right ultimately
adjudicated in the ordinary courts, the method chosen was private
legislation. This is due to the fact that under the Constitution the
residuary powers vested not in the courts, nor in the executive, but in
the legislature.18 Dissatisfaction with this method led to the setting up
of a Court of Claims in 1855, which, since the Tucker Act of 1887, has
12
Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, IOI U.S. 337 at 339 (1879). It is interesting to
speculate why other litigation privileges associated with sovereignty in England have
not been incorporated in American law, for example, the presumption that the government is not bound by statute, or the inability of military and civil servants to sue for
breach of contract of service because they are "dismissible at His Majesty's pleasure."
18
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 at 353, 27 S.Ct. 526 (1907).
14
Per Mr. Justice Miller, Langford v. United States, IOI U.S. 341 at 346

(1879).
15
106 U.S. 196 at 206, 1 S.Ct. 240 (1882).
16
I I Allen (93 Mass.) 157 at 162-163 (1865).
17
"A Survey of Public Interests," 58 HARV. L. REv. 909 at 916 (1945).
18
Freund, "Private Claims against the State," 8 PoL. Sc1. Q. 625 at 626-627
(1893); Richardson, "History, Jurisdiction, and Practice of the Court ·of Claims of the
United States," 7 So. L. REv. 781 et seq. (1882) describes in detail the legislative
process.
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had jurisdiction over suits against the United States "not sounding
in tort." 10
•
The Tucker Act also gave the court jurisdiction over claims founded
"upon the Constitution of the United States." It might have been
thought that wherever there was an appropriation of property contrary
to the Fifth Amendment, there would be an action under this act. It
is here that the influence of the rule that the king can do no wrong is
felt. Only if the taking is authorized and also effects permanent injury
and deprivation, so as to raise the implication of a contract and be
free from any tortious taint, will there be a remedy. 20 Again, where
in some states legislative consent to suit has been granted in the broadest language, the courts have interpreted it as excluding actions in tort
and quasi-contract. 21
This attitude of the Anglo-American jurisdictions is in sharp contrast with that prevailing on the Continent. There they began from
the premise that legislative silence was to be interpreted as consent to
suit, and their main concern was with the question of how far social
theory and public policy necessitated State responsibility for injuries
inflicted on the citizen by the operation of governmental activities.22
Innumerable are the juristic theories put forward to explain the present
Continental view, "administrative fault," "fault of the service," "equal' ity of burdens," "assumption of risk," "special sacrifice," but they
all rest on the operative fact of individual injury inflicted by the
goyernmental machine, and a recognition that public law demands
that these losses sustained in the administration of the public service
must be borne by the community as a whole.

B. Early Attempts to Limit Governmental Immunity
In the United States, some attempt has been made during this
century to limit governmental immunity in tort. The courts have
denied governmental immunity to many of the corporations set up to
19 For a full account of the work of this court see WATKINS, THE STATE AS A
PARTY LITIGANT (1927).
20
See 32 YALE L.J. 725 (1923); 43 YALE L.J. 674 (1934); Anderson, "Tort
and Implied Contract Liability of the Federal Government," 30 MINN. L. REv. 133
(1946).
21
For example, the State of Washington in Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329,
123 P. 4·50 (1912). And see Smith v. State, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920).
22
See Blachly ·and Oatman, "Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A
Comparative Study," 9 L. AND CoNTEM. PROB. 181 at 196 et seq. (1942); Trotabas,
"Liability in Damages under French Administrative Law," 12 J. OF CoMP. LEG.
AND INT. L. 44 (1930).
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perform public functions. 28 Statutes have been passed making the
United States, liable for patent infringements,24 for maritime torts,
whether involving merchant ships 25 or public vessels,28 and for damage
to oyster beds.21 Congress has also made arrangements for the administrative· settlement of claims by federal employees,28 of claims for
property damage up to $ rooo caused by the negligence of government
employers,29 and of various claims against the War Department, the
Postmaster General and the Secretary of the Treasury,8° with a usual
maximum of either $500 or $ rooo.
Nevertheless, the inadequacy of remedies against the government,
particularly in tort, caused both United States and England to provide
some other relief. In the United States this took the form of private
acts of Congress. For instance, the 74th and 75th Congress each
considered more than 2,300 private claim bills demanding relief exceeding$ I 00,000,000. 81 Private bills were not used in England, but a practice
grew up of the action being brought against the government official
personally on the understanding that the government would defend
the action on his behalf and meet any liability. So far was this carried that
in deference to complaints in Parliament with reference to motor vehicle
accidents, in I 941 the government appointed a leading barrister to determine in advance whether the alleged tort was committed in the course
and within the scope of the official's employment.32 If he so found, then
the government would automatically defend the action on behalf of the
official.
C. Immediate Motivation for Legislation in United States
and England
In view of these respective extra-judicial devices, why has each
country passed recent legislation on the matter? Has each country's
28
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct.
516 (1939).
24
36 Stat. L. 851 (1910); 40 Stat. L. 705 (1918), 35 U.S.C. (1946) § 68.
25
41 Stat. L. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1946) §§ 741, 742.
26
43 Stat. L. II 12 (1925), 46 U.S.C. (1946) § 781.
27
49 Stat. L. 1049 (1935); 57 Stat. L. 553 (1943), 28 U.S.C. (1946) § 25o(a).
28
39 Stat. L. 742 (1916).
29
42 Stat. L. 1066 (1922), repealed by 60 Stat. L. 846 (1946).
8
°For a list of these statutes see Gellhorn and Schenck, "Tort Actions against the
Federal Government," 47 CoL. L. REv. 722 at 724, note 15 (1947); and 53 YALE
L.J. 188 at 191, note 22 (1943).
81
See Holtzoff, "The Handling of Tort Claims against the Federal Government,"
9 L. AND CoNTEM. PROB. 3II at 322 (1942); Moore, "Federal Tort Claims Act,"
33 A.B.A.J. 857 at 858, note 14 (1947).
82
122 HANSARD 533·
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legislature suddenly adopted the continental theories of social justice?
Much more mundane considerations than this explain the statutory
changes.
In the United States, dissatisfaction with the private bill system
has long been widespread and vociferously expressed.88 Congress itself
realized that it was devoting a disproportionate amount of time to
non-legislative matters. Beyond that, injustice and political favoritism
resulted from the system. After a series of setbacks the Federal Tort
Claims Act was finally adopted on August 2, I946 34 as Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act. The measure was introduced under
the heading "More Efficient Use of Congressional Time." Jurisdiction
is given to the federal district courts sitting without juries, with an
appeal to the circuit court of appeals, or, with the consent of all parties,
to the Court of Claims.
In England, two I 946 decisions led to the legislative reform. In
Adamis v. Naylor 85 an action was brought against an army officer for
injuries to children received when they wandered onto a minefield in
charge of the defendant. The House of Lords said, obiter, that only
by a fiction could the army officer be the defendant, because the action
lay (if at all) against the occupier of the land, which was the Crown
and not the officer. When, later in the same year, an action was brought
against the superintendent of a go:vernment munitions factory for
injuries received on the premises by an invitee who fell into an unlit
· trench, the Court of Appeal, following the obiter dictum in Adams v.
Naylor, refused to allow the proceedings to continue against a fictitious
defendant. 86 Bowing to the protests of the legal profession and the
press, the government introduced the Crown Proceedings Bill which
became law on July 3I, I947, and came into operation on January I,

I948.s1
88
For example, MEMOIRS OF JoHN QuINCY ADAMS 480 (1876); Luce, "Petty
Business in Congress," 26 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 815 at 818-819 (1932); Shumate,
"Tort Claims Against State Governments," 9 L. AND CoNTEM. PRoB. 242 at 249 et
seq. (1942); Anderson, "Tort and Implied Contract Liability of the Federal Government," 30 MINN. L. REV. 133 at 149 (1946). For a collected list of Congress'
criticisms, see Memorandum for House Committee on Judiciary, Federal Tort Claims
Act, Appendix II printed in record of Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 49 et seq. (1942).
84
For a summary of the legislative history, see Report of the Joint Committee
on the Organization of Congress to Accompany S.2177, S. Rep. 1400, 79th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 30 (1946).
85
[1946] A.C. 543.
86
Royster v. Cavey, [ I 947] K.B. 204.
87
The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (Commencement) Order 1947, S.R. & 0.
1947 (No. 2527) IO & II Geo. 6, c. 44.
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II
ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION

The English Act is much more comprehensive than the American.
Besides imposing a general liability in tort, it abolishes petitions of
right, with the object of assimilating, as far as possible, suits against
the Crown to suits against subjects. It also deals in detail with procedure in suits both by and against the Crown and gives jurisdiction of
these suits to those courts which would have jurisdiction in actions
between subjects. By contrast, the United States statute deals solely
with suits in tort against the federal government.

A. Liability of Government for Torts of Its Agents
r. "Employees of the government." The United States is liable,
under the act, only for the torts of "any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 88 "Employee of the government" is defined in the act as including:
"· .. officers or employees of any Federal agency, members of
the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons
acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether
with or without compensation." 39
This definition should be compared with the English requirement
that:
.
" ... That officer has been directly or indirectly appointed by
the Crown and was at the material time paid in respect of his duties
as an officer of the Crown wholly out of the Consolidated Fund of
the United Kingdom, moneys provided by Parliament, the
Road Fund or any other Fund certified by the Treasury for the
purposes of this subsection or was at the material time holding an
office in respect of which the Treasury certify that the holder
thereof would normally be so paid." 40
The definition in the Federal Tort Claims Act is in general terms
and has latent ambiguities. 41 If the legislative history of earlier bills
is relied on, it will be broadly construed, with emphasis not on the
F.T.C.A., § 410(a).
F.T.C.A., § 402(b).
4
°Crown Proceedings Act, s. 2 (6) •
41
Gellhorn and Schenck, "Tort Actions against the Federal Government," 47
CoL. L. REv. 722 at 727 (1947).
88

39
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officer's main employment, but rather on his actual work when- the
tort was committed.42 A surfeit of litigation on the definition seems
inescapable. English courts have long had difficulty in framing a
definition of a servant of the Crown at common law.48 The English
statute is an attempt to obviate the necessity for more litigation by
furnishing an exact and inclusive definition, but it is open to criticism
because it is not all-embracing.44 There is an intermediate class of
English public official who, although appointed by a local or municipal
authority, is not the servant of that authority because his duties are
imposed on him by statute or common law as a government representative, and who is outside section 2( 6) because he is not appointed by
the Crown. For example, since policemen are in that intermediate
class, neither the municipality which appoints them nor the Crown is
answerable for their torts; 45 only the individual himself can be sued.
The conclusion seems to be that the American definition, despite its
uncertainty, is likely to lead to more just results than the definite but ·
narrow English definition. Both definitions provide for the "dollar a
year man"; but the English statute necessarily excludes the mere
· volunteer and it seems likely that persons such as federal bond drive
voli.mteers would not be "employees" for the purposes of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, because there would be no contract of service and
no papers of appointment.
2. Independent contractors. Sometimes, the ordinary employer is
liable for the torts of independent contractors, and there seems no
reason why governments should not be similarly liable. This is accomplished in the English Act by the following provisions. The Crown is
liable for the torts of servants or "agents," and ''agent," when used in
relation to the Crown, includes an independent contractor employed by
the Crown.46 Section 40 ( 2) ( d) provides that:
"Except as therein otherwise expressly provided, nothing in
this Act shall ... subject the Crown to any greater liabilities in
respect of the acts or omissions of any independent contractor
42

Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 16 (1942).
43
See Moore, "Liability for Acts of Pqblic Servants," 2f L.Q. REV. 12 (1907);
and Street, "Crown Proceedings," (paper delivered at Anglo-French Legal Conference,
June, 1947), p. II.
44
See Street, "Defendants under the Crown Proceedings Act 1947," 97 L.J. 685
(1947).
45
Fisher v. Oldham Corporation, [1930] 2 K.B. 364; Stanbury v. Exeter Corporation, [1905] 2 K.B. 838 {sanitary inspector).
46
Crown Proceedings Act, s. 38 ( 2).
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employed by the Crown than those to which the Crown would be
subject in respect of such acts or omissions if it were a private
person ...."
Since the Federal Tort Claims Act has no express provision on the
matter, the United States can be so liable only if "employee" includes
"independent contractor." This seems unlikely, at least if the New
York interpretation is any indication of the way in which the federal
statute will be construed. There, under section I 2a of the Court of
Claims Act of 1929 the State of New York was liable for the torts of
"its officers and employees," but this was taken to exempt the state from
liability for the negligence of an independent contractor.4"
3. Government corporations. Will the respective governments be
liable for the acts of employees of government corporations? In England, no express reference is made to these bodies, and therefore the
answer depends solely on application of the arbitrary rules laid down
by section 2 ( 6) and referred to in the preceding paragraph. Only if
the employee is within that definition will the Crown be liable. The
United States will be liable for the acts of employees of a federal
corporation if its primary function is to act as, and it is at the time of
the tort in fact acting as, the agency or instrumentality of the United
States. Both countries had difficulty at common law in determining
when such bodies could shelter under the cloak of the immunity of the
government, and it seems that both acts fail to end the common law
ambiguities. 48 It is to be hoped that the courts take the line that
whenever under the respective acts the government is not liable for
acts committed by a servant within the scope of his employment, then
the governmental corporation is liable at common law. The matter
may be more serious in the United States than in England, because in
the latter country joinder of the corporation and the government is
permitted; whereas, if the doubts as to the availability of joinder
procedure in the United States are well-founded, a- plaintiff making
the wrong choice may find his action against the other barred by lapse
of time.
4. Employee acting "within the scope of his office o_r employment."
47

SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

I.Aw

REVISION COMMISSION OF THE STATE

NEw YoRK', 941 at 947 and 951 at 973 (1936).
48
See "Litigation with Nationalized Industry," 96 L.J. 297, 3II at 312 (1946);
Sellar, "Government Corporations," 24 CAN. B. REv. 383, 489 at 506 (1946). The
agency and the Crown may well be jointly liable under English law, whereas F.T.C.A.,
§ 423 provides that the agency can never be sued if the United States is liable.
OF
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The United States act defines "scope of his office or employment" only
to the extent of stating that it means "acting in line of duty" 49 in the
case of a member of the military or naval forces. One remembers the
thousands of cases litigated in England to interpret "scope of employment" in the Workmen's Compensation Acts and hopes that the United
States will be spared that. Obviously, the phrase is susceptible either
of a conservative or liberal interpretation at the whim of the courts.
This di$culty is overcome in the English Act by assimilating governmental liability to the common law rule of respondeat superior, section
2(1) providing that "the Crown shall be subject to all those liabilities
in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it
would be subject:- (a) in respect of torts committed by its servants
or agents." 50

B. Liability of Government Arising Out of Ownership
of Property
The United States is liable under the act only for the "negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee." Some torts, however,
cannot be regarded as the act of the servant, but liability for them
depends entirely on the ownership of the instrumentality causing the
damage. For instance, when there is a liability for the carrying on of
an ultra-hazardous activity, no one servant is responsible; the tort is
solely that of the owner of the instrumentality. Under the act it seems
that the United States will not be liable for any such acts or omissions
which cannot be attributed to an employee. This would constitute
a most serious deficiency in the act. Conscious of this situation, the
framers of the English act introduced a special provision making the
Crown liable in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common
law to the ownership, occupation, possession or control of property. 51
It is surprising that the United States act uses the words "negligent
or wrongful" instead of "tortious." It has led to discussion whether a
tort creating liability without fault can be called "wrongful"; 52 but
presumably the courts will interpret "wrongful" as covering all legal
wrongs of a delictual nature.
49

F.T.C.A., § 402(c).
New York State has a similarly phrased provision. N.Y. Court of Claims Act,
§ 8, enacted by N.Y. Laws (1939) c. 860.
51
Crown Proceedings Act, s. 2(1)(c).
52
56 YALE L.J. 534 at 540-542 (1947).
50
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C. Quasi-Contract Liability
The United States is held not liable under the Tucker Act for
quasi-contract, and the courts have also refused to permit the plaintiff
to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit.5 3 Nothing in the new act can be
said to create a liability in quasi-contract. Commentators on the act,
mindful that the alternative choice of the Court of Claims and the
federal district court sometimes available under the Tucker Act is
not here available, have thought that, even so, "the issue will be not
whether the claimant may maintain his suit but in which court he should
bring it." 54 That is perhaps the least of the unfortunate results of this
situation. Firstly, an action in tort is not always an alternative to an
action in quasi-contract.55 Secondly, even where the facts are such that
quasi-contract is merely an alternative to tort, the plaintiff's remedy in
tort may be inadequate. For instance, in some states, in an action for
trespass, damages for use and occupation of the land of the plaintiff
cannot be recovered where the plaintiff's land has not been damaged,
yet in an action in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment the court will
award damages for that use. 56 English courts have never denied waiver
on a petition of right,57 and with the abolition of petition of right in the
act 58 there seems no obstacle, whether jurisdictional or of substantive
law, to waiver by the plaintiff, or to suing in quasi-contract.

D. Damages for which Recovery May be Had
The United States is liable only for money claims "on account of
damages to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or
death." 59 Why these words were introduced at all is perplexing,6° for
53

Harley v. United States, 198 U.S. 229, 25 S.Ct. 634 (1905).
56 YALE L.J. 534 at 541 (1947).
55
For example, if A preserves B's belongings from impending harm, A has an
action in quasi-contract for the value of his services and expenditure, but no action
in tort.
56
Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E. (2d) 231 (1946);
see Corbin, "Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit," 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910), and
for further instances, Bavins v. London and South Western Bank, [1900] 1 Q.B. 270;
Cohen v. City of New York, 283 N.Y. u2, 27 N.E. (2d) 803 (1940).
57
Brocklebank, Ltd. v. The King, [1925] 1 K.B. 52 at 68; Marshal Shipping
Co. v. Board of Trade, [1923] 2 K.B. 343 at 356.
58
Crown Proceedings Act, s. l.
69
F.T.C.A., § 410 (a).
60
Some light may be thrown on the matter by the evidence of the Special Assistant to the Attorney General (A. Holtzoff) on an earlier Bill, Hearings before the
- Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 36 (1940),
where he indicates that the Small Claims Act of I 922 included only property damage,
54
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without them the United States would still be rendered liable only
for torts. Perhaps a court seeking a meaning for them may say that a
husband suing for the loss of his wife's society and services is not suing
for property damage or personal injury.61 So much is likely, but there
is the further but less probable chance that a court will say that the act,
referring expressly to property damage and personal damage, excludes
merely pecuniary damage; for example, a man knocked down by an
automobile may claim property damage for his broken watch, personal
damage for his broken leg, but can he also recover under this act
pecuniary damage for his broken contract of employment? That such
an interpretation is possible, however remotely, indicates that a more
precise form of words · should have been used. The English act, by
rendering the Crown subject to "all those liabilities" of the subject,
avoids any such ambiguity.

E. Exceptions to Government Tort Liability under the Acts
Non-negligent torts and abuse of discretion. There are several
exceptions in the United States Act, perhaps the most important of
which is:
I.

"Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
Federal agency or an employee o~ the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused." 62
This exception saves the United States from liability for unconstitutional acts (which of course could not arise in England). It also
excepts non-negligent torts committed "in the exercise of a statute or
regulation." The italicised words are vague, and how remote an act
can be from the actual command of a statute without going outside this
and that that bill was drafted so as to make it clear that claims for personal injury as
well as property damage were included. New York State, which had a similar form of
wording in its Court of Claims Act of 1922, wisely avoids the pitfall in its 1939 Act,
section 8 of which provides: "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and
action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in
accordance' with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations.••."
61
See Wilson v. Grace, 273 Mass. 146, 173 N.E. 524 (1930), for such an
interpretation of a statute creating liability for "injury to the person."
e2 F.T.C.A., § 421 (a).
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exception can only be determined by the courts. 63 Examination of policy
suggests that only consequences intended and contemplated by the
rule-making body are included,64 and that the government is unwilling
to accept liability for bad administration as distinct from actively
reprehensible conduct. No express provisions being included in the
English act, common law rules must be applied. The Crown will never
be liable for acts carried out in performance of an imperative statutory
direction ( that is, one saying what shall be done and how it is to be
done) unless there is negligence ( query whether the United States
will be liable for the negligent performance of such a compulsory
statutory obligation) or for non-tortious performance executed with
permissive statutory authority. 65
The second part of this exception excludes claims based on the
exercise of discretionary functions. This would seem to restate the
existing law with regard to public officers and is not mentioned in
the English act. Nothing contained in the legislation will prevent
mandamus from lying against the officer himself where he refuses to
exercise a discretionary function. It is clearly undesirable that the
operation of a government agency should be hindered by litigation
alleging negligent or abusive use of discretion. The justification for
also exempting non-exercise of discretion is not so clear. The same
policy factors which have influenced the development of the law
relating to public officers should be relevant here, and it seems that
· both acts are deficient in not allowing even mandamus to lie against
the government in such cases.
The English statute provides that:
" ... Where the Crown is bound by a statutory duty which is
binding also upon persons other than the Crown and its officers,
then, ... the Crown shall, in respect of a failure to comply with
that duty, be subject to all those liabilities in tort (if any) to
68

It has been suggested that on the introduction of this act, the courts may
reverse their tendency to find a "taking'' within the Tucker Acts because there will
now be a remedy in tort. This does not take account of the fact that most of the
"taking" cases would fall within this exception to the act. To narrow the interpretation of the Tucker Act would be to deprive many plaintiffs of all remedy.
84
See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5375
and H.R. 6473, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 29 (1942).
65
For example, Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill, 6 App. Cas. 193 (1881);
an asylum erected under statutory powers constituted a nuisance, and because the
statute merely authorized the creation of an asylum, but not in the particular place and
manner chosen by the defendants, statutory authority was no defense to an action for
nuisance.
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which it would be so subject if it were a private person of full age
and capacity." 66
The Federal Tort Claims Act is silent on the matter, but the express
reference to "failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty" suggests there was no intention to exempt from such liability.
All seems to depend on whether a breach of statutory duty is a wrongful
omission, and it seems probable that the courts will so hold.
2. Torts of the Post Office Department, etc. Section 42r (b)
exempts "any claim arising out of the loss, misc~rriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter." There is a similar provision
in section 9(r) of the English Act.67 The latter compares unfavorably
with its American counterpart in that it adds:
" ... nor shall any officer of the Crown be subject, except at
the suit of the Crown, to any liability for any of the matters
aforesaid."
That a person witnessing his letter torn to pieces by the postmaster
should not even have a remedy against the postmaster has been the
subject of protest by Viscount Simon in Parliament.68 The English
section also provides, for the first time, that a person registering a postal
packet shall have a legal cause of action against the government.69
Since Congress justified the exception in the United States act by
pointing out the ease with which postal matter is registrable,7° it is
regrettable that the act does not impose a clear-cut civil liability for
registered mail similar to that in the English statute.
The further exemptions in section 42 I of claims arising out of the
administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act,. the quarantine law
and the fiscal and monetary systems, have no parallel in the English
statute. No clear and conclusive explanation for them is traceable in
the legislative history, and it seems possible that section 42r(a) would
have been adequate protection. It certainly appears harsh that the
victim of a quarantine imposed by gross negligence shoulc! have no
action against the United States.
3. Claims arising out of "assault, battery, false imprisonment," etc.
66

Crown Proceedings Act, s. 2 ( 2) .
This extends also to telephonic communications, since they too are under the
control of the Post Office.
68
146 HANSARD, no. 39 at 76 ( 1947).
69
Crown Proceedings Act, s. 9 ( 2) .
70
Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th
Cong., 3d sess., p. 3 8 ( 1940).
67
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The exemptions of maritime tort~, Tennessee Valley and Panama Canal
operations, and Customs and Tax Collectors, need not be considered
here because other statutory provision for compensation has been made.
Far more important is the exclusion of "any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights." 11 This is the most serious fl.aw in the United States
act; none of these torts is exempted from the operation of the English
act. The reasons adduced in support of the provisions are unsatisfactory.
Only in committee hearings in earlier bills was any justification attempted, and it was then said that such suits were difficult to defend
and likely to result in awards of high damages. The first argument is
untenable, and the second loses its force when it is remembered that no
jury actions are permitted under the act. This provision appears the
more remarkable when it is noted that jury actions are allowed in
proceedings under the English act. It is much to be feared that unless
the English example is here followed in amending legislation, a spate
of private claim bills will be unavoidable.
4. Torts committed by the armed forces. The United States has
accepted a larger degree of responsibility for the acts of the armed
forces than has the British government. True, the former exempts "any
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,m 2 but in administrative
regulations and interpretations 78 "combatant activity" has been given
a restricted meaning not extending to practice maneuvers or to any
operations not directly connected with engaging the enemy, an interpretation which the courts may well follow. 74 That exemption apart, the
United States accepts liability for acts of military and naval personnel
performed in "line of duty," 75 a phrase which will presumably receive
a broader interpretation than "scope of employment." 76 The Crown
Proceedings Act does not make any extension for service personnel of
F.T.C.A., § 421 (h).
F.T.C.A., § 421(j).
78 The phrase does not seem to have been litigated.
74
On the contrary, the Assistant Attorney General said it was intended to avoid
the inconvenience that would result from bringing military personnel from their
duties to the courts in time of war. Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6473, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 12 (1942).
75
F.T.C.A., § 402 (c).
76
For example, in O'Hagan v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 408 (1945), an officer
moving from one unit to another in his automobile, and not proceeding by the most
direct route, was held to be "in line of duty" for the purposes of an allowance claim.
71

72
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the ordinary principle of vicarious liability adopted in section 2 (I). On
the contrary, section IO provides that neither the Crown nor the i.p.dividual service member responsible should be sued for causing the death
or personal injury of another service member, if the latter were either
on duty or on service property, and if also "his suffering that thing has
been or will be treated as attributable to service" for pensions purposes.
Moreover, section r r provides that the act shall not "extinguish or
abridge any powers or authorities exercisable by the Crown, whether in
time of peace or of war, for the purpose of the defence of the realm or
o·f training, or maintaining the efficiency of any of the armed forces of
the Crown." It is to be noted also that England has no provision for
administrative determination of civil claims against the Crown in respect
of military operations whether in war or in peace.
,
5. Claims arising in foreign countries. Finally, the Federal Tort
Claims Act exempts "any claim arising in a foreign country.m7 Rather
surprisingly, no such exclusion is made in the English act. Perhaps
the fairest provision would be one empowering the government to make
separate arrangements with foreign countries, allowing actions against
each other on a reciprocal basis, an arrangement which might have been
expected to have been included in the United States act since reciprocity
arrangements operate in the field of contract under the Tucker Act.
England seems to have placed herself at a disadvantage by what may
well have been an oversight, since the matter was not raised in Parlia.:.
ment. The United States has empowered the Secretary of State to settle
claims for personal injuries to an alien caused by acts of her employees
in f~reign countries. 78

F. Provisions for Administrative Settlement of Claims
It is the provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act for administrative
settlement of claims which constitutes the greatest single advantage of
the United States act over the English one. Section 403 empowers the'
head of each federal agency or his nominee "to consider, ascertain,
adjusf, determine and settle any claim against the United States for
money only ... where the total amount of the claim does not exceed
$moo." The claimant is free to accept or reject the award; if he accepts,
77
·
F.T.C.A., § 410 (k). The reason for this exception (not in the earlier bills)
adduced in 1942 by the Assistant Attorney General was that under the act the lex
situs determines the liability of the United States. Hearings before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 35 (1942).
78
49 Stat. L. u38 (1936), 31 U.S.C. (1946) § 224(a).
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the award is final and constitutes a complete release; if he refuses he
may commence normal court proceedings. The provision seems welldrafted with this exception: it could have been made clear (as is
probably the case) that there could be an administrative settlement of
a claim exceeding $ moo if the claimant is prepared to accept, eventually, an award withitJ. the $moo limit.79
This provision for administrative settlement, in line as it is with
earlier but more limited provisions, is wholly admirable. However, complaints about the method have been numerous. It is said that there is no
restraint on overgenerosity by officials, but the provision for each agency
head to make annual reports to Congress of claims paid would seem to be
adequate. 8 ° Further criticisms are that there should be only one governmental claim agency and that the settlements should be effectively
reviewed by Congress. The answers to these objections are that the
essential features of administrative settlement must be cheapness, :flexibility, accessibility and speed, and that these essentials will be met by
the system provided. The claims staff of agencies have experience
and appear to have functioned satisfactorily. A valid objection to the
provisions may be that a time limit for filing the claim or notice of
intention to claim might have been included. 81 There seems no force
in the objection that no appeal is possible from the agency decision,
when it is remembered that the claimant may reject the proposed
agency settlement and commence court proceedings.
The English Act contains no provisions for administrative settlement. Unlike the United States, England has no history of statutory
provision for settlement of civil claims against the government, and
the matter was not even discussed in the parliamentary preliminaries
to the enactment of the legislation. The explanation for the English
attitude may be as follows. The statute was r~garded as essentially
lawyers' law, and, among English lawyers, that dislike of extra-judicial
proceedings exemplified by Lord Hewart 82 still persists. Beyond that,
the avowed aim of the English act was to assimilate the Crown to the
position of the private subject, and there are no statutory arrangements
for administrative settlement of claims against him. Only two points
can be made in defense of the English attitude. There is nothing to
79

See Borchard, "Tort Claims against the Government: Municipal, State and
Federal Liability," 33 A.B.A.J. 221 at 222 (1947).
8
°F.T.C.A., § 404.
81
And see McGuire, "Tort Claims against the United States," 19 GEo. L.J. 133
at 141, note 12 (1931).
82
THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929).
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prevent unofficial compromise of civil claims outside court, whether
, they are against the government or the private ~itizen, and, in practice,
most claims are settled there. Moreover, suits against the government
not exceeding $800 can be instituted in the county courts where costs
are low and trials are speedy and less formal than in th~ High Court.83

G. Finality of Decisions under Legislation
When suits are brought under section 4rn(a) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act,
·
"The judgment in such an action shall constitute a complete
bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject
matter, against the employee of the Government...." 84
Similarly, the acceptance of an administrative settlement:
". . . shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall
constitute a complete release by the claimant of any claim against
the United States and against the employee of the Government
... by reason of the same subject matter." 85
The common law rules of res judicata provide that a former judgment is a bar to a subsequent action if it is between the same parties, on
identical subject matter, and in respect of one and the same cause of
action. This act extends these rules at least by providing that actions
against the United States bar actions against the employee. Beyond
that, does the statute merely restate the rules of res judicata? It is
submitted that the loose expression "by reason of the same subject
matter" would cover identity of subject matter, but not identity of cause
of action, and that therefore this act extends the common law rules by
barring further suits even though based on a different cause of action.For instance, it was held in Brunsden v. Humphrey that "the real
test is not ... whether the plaintiff had the opportunity of recovering
in the first action what he claims to recover in the second" 86 and that
a driver of a cab who had in a previous action recovered for damage
to the cab caused by the defendant's negligence was not barred from
further proceedings for personal injuries, since actions for property
damage and personal injuries constitute separate causes of action. Under
88

Crown Proceedings Act, s. I 5.
F.T.C.A., § 410(b).
85
F.T.C.A., § 403(d).
86
14 Q.B.D. 141 at 151 (1884).
84
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the act it seems that such a second action would be denied to the
plaintiff. The English act leaves untouched the common law rules, so
that the plaintiff could even maintain a separate action against the
employee after having sued the Crown.87
If a judgment is obtained against the United States government
the question arises whether the government has a right of subrogation
against the employee. In 1941, the Attorney General advised that the
Secretary of Agriculture had no authority to require an employee to
reimburse the government for a payment made in settlement of a claim
for property damage resulting from the employee's negligence.88 This
opinion must be limited to administrative settlements: it seems that the
ordinary rules of subrogation will apply to judicial decisions against
the government. Of course, the government is more likely to resort to
disciplinary than to legal action against its employees. The English
position is identical, except that joinder of the employee is definitely
permitted in the original proceeding.

H. Rules of Evidence-Production of Government Documents
There has been some discussion as to whether admissions of officers
will bind the government in subsequent litigation. 89 There seems no
reason why, in both jurisdictions, the ordinary rules of agency in
evidence should not apply to these situations. Another more perplexing
problem, not covered in the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the most
hotly contended portion of the Crown Proceedings Act, is that of
production of government documents. The latter act for the first time
allows discovery of documents against the Crown as of right but
.. absolves the Crown from the requirement of producing documents if
it would be injurious to the public interest. Most controversial of all,
the Minister, not the court, is the sole judge of whether production
is in the public interest.90 This has a marked tendency toward bureaucratic oppression, yet, in fairness, it must be admitted that none of the
experienced members of the judiciary who spoke on the matter in the
87

Part II of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935
which authorizes (on certain conditions) suits against a joint tortfeasor after earlier
proceedings have been instituted against another joint tortfeasor, shall bind the
Crown. Crown Proceedings Act, s. 4 ( 2).
88
40 OP. Arn. GEN. (March 25, 1941).
89
Spilman, "Evidence and Admissions of Government Employees under the
Act," 33 A.B.A.J. 958 (1947).
~o Crown Proceedings Act, s. 28. Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., [1942] A.C.
624.
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House of Lords on the passage of the bill thought that judges were
competent to decide this matter.91
The American position seems unsettled. Whether discovery against
the United States is permissible at all is doubtful. At least one writer
has said recently that freedom from discovery is part of the immunity
of the government, and that the Federal Rules are inapplicable.92
Certainly the American authorities seem in a chaotic state, particularly
as regards the validity and effect of departmental regulations forbidding disclosure. Wigmore suggests that all documents should be
disclosed unless they relate to secrets of state in military or international
affairs, and that regulations' purporting to extend the privilege beyond
these limits are void,03 but no cases have been found which reached that
conclusion. Just what the United States as plaintiff must produce is
uncertain. For instance, United States v. General Motors 94 indicates
that it must produce its files, but Walling v. Comet Carriers, Inc., 95 and
Fleming v. Bernardi9 6 deny that proposition. What documents cannot
be produced because it would be contrary to the public interest is not
settled,97 nor is it clear whether the judge should himself look at the
documents to settle this question. The opinion of the Attorney General
has been that the return made by the head of the department is conclusive, but it is doubtful whetJ;ier the courts will accept that ruling.98 A
great opportunity was lost by not dealing with these matters in the
1946 act, for it may take years to unravel the common law complexities.
The English legislation is to be commended for tackling the problem,
at least, but the United States courts still have the opportunity, now
denied to their opposite numbers in England, of formulating what the
writer believes to be desirable rules, namely, that the government
should be compelled to produce in litigation all relevant documents
91
Cf. the voluntary and at least partial abandonment by the Supreme Court
of its claims to review questions of fact on appeals from administrative tribunals.
2
1l O'Reilly, "Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign
Immunity," 21 N.C. L. REv. I (1942). Contra: Pike and Fischer, "Discovery
against Federal Administrative Agencies," 56 HARV. L. REV. 1125 (1943). But see
United States v. General Motors Corporation, (D.C. Ill. 1942) 2 F.R.D. 528.
93
8 W1GM0RE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2378a (1940).
94
(D.C. Ill. 1942) 2 F.R.D. 528.
95
(D.C. N.Y. 1944) 3 F.R.D. 442.
96
(D.C. Ohio 1941) 1 F.R.D. 624.
1li Robinson v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 159 (1915); United States v. General
Motors Corporation, (D.C. Ill. 1942) 2 F.R.D. 528.
98
13 OP. Arn. GEN. 539 (1871). See Crosby v. Pacific Lines, Ltd., (C.C.A.
9th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 470; Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 26
F. Supp. 583.
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( whether or not it is a party), that the only exceptions should be state
secrets in international and military affairs, and that the court, assisted
by affidavit evidence from the head of the department, should be the
sole judge whether production is to be allowed.

I. Limiiation Provisions
Both acts prescribe a limitation period of one year. 00 The objects of
this shortened period of limitation must be to prevent the government's
having outstanding financial liabilities hanging over its head for an
excessively long time, to reduce the risk of fraudulent claims 100 and at
the same time to protect the citizen claimant from prejudice in his
action. In the light of these tests, a limitation period of one year seems
reasonable, but one difference between the two acts calls for investigation. The Tort Claims Act furnishes no extension for disability of the
plaintiff. It is usual for statutes of limitation to extend the period by
the duration of the infancy or insanity of the plaintiff. It may have
. been thought by the framers of the act that if, for instance, a six year
old were the victim of negligent driving of a government servant, the
possibility of the action being brought at any time within the next
sixteen years could not be countenanced by the government. It is agreed
that to extend the period in that fashion would be unwise, yet it is
contended that there is much to be said for the British compromise.
The Crown Proceedings Act incorporates by reference the Limitation
Act of r939. After providing generally for an extension of the period
of infancy or lunacy, section 22(d) of the latter statute enacts that in
actions against public authorities (now including the Crown) the period
of one year shall be extended only when the plaintiff proves that "the
person under a disability was not, at the time when the right of action
accrued to him, in the custody of a parent." 101 Such a clause prevents
F.T.C.A., § 420; Crown Proceedings Act, s. 30(2).
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Thomann v. Rochester, 256 N.Y. 165 at 170,
172, 176 N.E. 129 (1931); "A judgment against a municipal corporation must be
- paid out of the public purse. Raids by the unscrupulous will multiply apace if claims
may be postponed till the injury is stale. The law does not condemn as arbitrary a
classification of rights and remedies that is thus rooted in the public needs, •••
" .•• Prompt service of the notice would have made it possible for the defendant
to investigate the loss and ascertain whether the claim had been swollen in disfigurement of truth. Scrutiny becomes futile with the lapse of the obscuring years."
101
The Public Authorities Protection Act of 1893, which formerly controlled
actions against public authorities, contained no extension for infants, and the Court
of Appeal, in Jacobs v. London County Council, [1935] 1 K.B. 67, held that none
could be implied. The Law Revision Committee set up by the Lord Chancellor in
99

10

° Cf.
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injustice being done where the -infant plaintiff has no parent available
to sue on his behalf, and might be followed with advantage in the
United States. This would appear to be the main case where hardship
might ensue to the plaintiff if a rigid period of twelve months were
insisted on. One article has suggested ( without particular reference to
disability) that the courts should be given general discretion to extend
the time limit for reasonable cause.102 The writer thinks the occasions
when a time limit of twelve months is inadequate are limited to cases
where the plaintiff is disabled and has no legal guardian at that time,
and that these specific instances could be met by a particular clause on
the order of the English one. To vest the courts with such a discretion
might embarrass the government, and it seems that the analogies of
private law are best followed here.

F

Joinder of Parties

Uncertainty as to how far the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to suits under the act makes it doubtful whether joinder of
private' parties as defendants is permitted under the act. The recent
case of Englehardt v. United States 108 held that joinder was permissible
where the plaintiff and the defendants were citizens of different states,
but whether that decision will be generally followed, or be applicable
where the plaintiff and defendants are citizens of the same state can
be finally decided only by the Supreme Court. 104 The English Act
avoids these pitfalls by providing that "subject to the provisions of this
Act, all such civil proceedings by or against the Crown . . . shall be
instituted and ,proceeded with in accordance with rules of court and
not otherwise." 105

K. Rights of Set-off and Counterclaim
Under the English Act the subject sued by the Crown has the same
rights of set-off and counterclaim as against another subject, with
1934, in their Fifth Interim Report, on statutes of _limitation (December, 1936,
Cmd. 5334) recommended the inclusion of the extension.
102
Gellhorn and Schenck, "Tort Actions against the Federal Government," 47
CoL. L. REv. 722 at 734 (1947).
108
(D.C. Md. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 451. And see United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584 at 590, 61 S. Ct. 767 (1941).
104
Cf., 56 YALE L.J. 534 at 554 (1947); Gellhorn and Schenck, "Tort Actions
against the Federal Government," 47 CoL. L. REv. 722 at 733 (1947); Gottlieb,
"Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpr_etation," 35 GEO. L.J. l at 36 (1946).
105
Crown Proceedings Act, s. 13.
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certain limited exceptions in tax proceedings.100 This is another example
of the wider scope of the English legislation affording more comprehensive relief to the citizen. The Federal Tort Claims Act, while
giving the government those full rights of counterclaim and set-off
found in the Tucker Act, does not extend the rights of the citizen sued
by the United States,107 whose rights of counterclaim seem to be limited
as follows. If he seeks an affirmative money judgment it must be a
claim over which the court could have exercised jurisdiction in an
original suit. 108 Any counterclaim must either arise out of the same
transaction as the government's cause of action or be one over which
the court could have had original jurisdiction.100 Therefore, a United
States tort can be the subject of a counterclaim only when the government bases its case on the same cause of action and the amount of the
counterclaim is such that a judgment against the United States would
not result.
,
L. Costs
It has always been a principle of American law that the government
shall not pay costs unless clearly required to do so by statute. In
England there have been great statutory inroads on that rule since
1855: costs have been payable on petition of right since 1860,110 and
since 1933 the Crown has paid and received costs like a private litigant.111 By contrast, the United States does not pay costs (although
it receives them) under the Tucker Act. Section 4m of the l 946 act
allows costs ( except attorneys' fees) to the successful litigant, and
section 422 provides that the court, or the Attorney General or other
official settling a case before judgment,
" ... may, as a part of the judgment, award, or settlement, determine and allow reasonable attorney's fees, which, if the recovery
is $500 or more, shall not exceed ten percentum of the amount
recovered under part 2, [ without suit] or 20 percentum of the
amount recoyered under part 3, [suit filed] to be paid out of
but not in addition to the amount of the judgment, award or
settlement. . . ."
100

Id., s. 35(2) (g).
F.T.C.A., § 41 I.
108
United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 60 S.Ct. 659 (1940).
109
United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506,
60 S.Ct. 653 (1940).
110
Petitions of Right Act of 1860, s. 12, 23 & 24 Viet. c. 34.
111
Administration .of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1933, s. 7, 23 &
24 Geo. 5, c. 36.
107
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There seems no reason why the United States should be in a privileged, position, and the citizen's lawyer handicapped in suits between
government and citizen, and the equal treatment of subject and king
in regard to costs achieved in England might be copied by the United
States.
M. Limitation on Remedies Available
Money claims only may be pursued against the United States, and
no relief by way of injunction, specific performance, recovery of specific
chattels or execution of a judgment is permitted. Section 2r of the
Crown Proceedings Act forbids injunction, specific performance and
specific delivery, but authorizes the court in lieu thereof to make orders
declaratory of the rights of the parties, which orders will no doubt in
practice be carried out. In neither act-is any effective means provided
for enforcing judgments against the government. It is true that the
English Act details a procedure for satisfaction of orders, but in the last
analysis there is no enforcement provision, and execution is forbidden.
The suitor has no legal remedy if the legislature makes no appropriation.112 The fact that in nuisance actions against the United States not
even a declaratory order or injunction is available constitutes a serious
limitation on the plaintiff's rights. The English statute authorizes
interest at the ordinary rates to be available against the government
on judgment debts, on costs, and even on the damages before the date
of judgment.113 The United States act gives a lesser remedy to the
plaintiff by forbidding interest before judgment and also punitive
damages.114

III
CONCLUSION

Thus, without regard to any particular social theory, force of circumstances has compelled both England and the United States to
acknowledge governmental liability'for wrongs inflicted on the citizen
through the functioning of governmental agencies. The approach of
both English and American acts is an extension of private law concepts of agency and vicarious liability to the government.
It may be said that the object of both acts is to assimilate the posi112
Hetfield v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 419 (1933); See Laski, "Responsibility
of the State in England," 32 HARV. L. REv. 447 at 455 (1919); Gottlieb, "Federal
Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation," 35 GEo. L.J. l at 36, note 47 (1946).
118
Crown Proceedings Act, s. 24.
m F.T.C.A., § 41o(a).
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tion of the citizen as against the government to his position when suing
a~other citizen, as far as reasonably practicable. It has been seen that
the assimilation is far from complete in either system. The English act
is too tender to the executive, and shows traces throughout of compromises with government departments. The latter have long been opposed
to such legislation, and lingering traces of this hostility are seen in the
limits imposed on military 115 and post-office liability and, above all, in
the rules relating to discovery. Where, however, to give a complete
remedy to the citizen would not interfere with the executive, there
seems a readiness in the English act to accord him that remedy. Nothing
in the act suggests that Parliament seized every chance to cut down
financial liability; on the contrary, the act is marked by its generosity.
One is struck, too, by its orthodoxy. It never goes beyond the limits of
existing private law, and when it does not go so far, the explanation
seems to be executive pressure. In this very orthodoxy lies one of the
act's greatest weaknesses, the absence of provision for administrative
settlement.
The United States statute bears less trac.e of executive interference,
and also provides for administrative determination of small claims.
On the other hand, the determination of Congress to avoid what are
thought to be pecuniarily excessive liabilities is manifest throughout.
This seems to explain such serious gaps as the exemption of assault,
defamation and numerous other torts. Moreover, it suffers in comparison with the English act by covering a narrower field. Too many
procedural matters such as joinder and discovery are left unsettled.
It is unfortunate that this act and the Tucker Act have not been dovetailed more completely, for this has led to such lacuna as the total
failure to provide for quasi-contract actions, and to differences between
the treatment of government contract and government tort, for instance,
in costs provisions. These are neither logical nor defensible.
Each act would be improved if it assimilated more exactly the
rules between citizen and government with those operating between
citizen and citizen. That so much, at least, should be done in each
country the writer has no doubt. The hesitancy of Congress and the
115

For example, Viscount Jowitt, Lord Chancellor, speaking with reference to the
military exemptions (46 HANSARD, no. 139 at 60) said: "Let me be quite frank: this
clause . • • is one of the clauses I have been pressed and indeed compelled by the
Service Departments to insert in order to overcome the misgivings or, if you like, the
reluctance which they feel, and have traditionally felt, about the introduction of this
Bill ••.. I must make it plain that this is one of the clauses which I have had to say I
will see is in the Bill."
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British departments must be overcome, and the above-mentioned flaws
of the respective acts put right. Such reform is surely not ahead of
current lay and legal opinion, and could be expected to be implemented
without serious public opposition.
.
There remains the further question: Is it enough merely tq_ extend
the private law to the government? If the fire brigade floods your
shop while extinguishing a fire next door, if you are knocked down
accidentally by a state ambulance rushing a critically ill patient to the
hospital, if in. attempting the arrest of a street bandit you are fired
upon, are you to have a right of action for damages against the government? There is ethical justification for the assumption of liability in
such cases, but the difficulty is to decide where to draw the line, once
the boundaries of fault are violated. A man may suffer economic loss
through broad decisions of policy worked out by the government. If,
for instance, the government institutes gasoline rationing, the man who
depends on an automobile for his livelihood suffers' more than his
neighbor. If, at a lower level of administrative policy, admission· of
children to public places of amusement in Blanktown is temporarily
prohibited during an epidemic, are the cinema owners to be compensated? And what of the owner of the candy store in the cinema foyer?
If a shopkeeper has his application for a license turned down through
error, is he entitled to damages?
It is a hard task to define the criteria which determine when, beyond
the bounds of existing common law, the government should assume
liability. Perhaps, where the limits of the injury ensuing on governmental operations can reasonably be foreseen, or when it is to be
anticipated that the effects of governmental action will be felt by
certain individuals, and the damage is not too remote, the government
ought to be liable. The government can predict that its vehicles may
knock down pedestrians, and that policemen in firing at a gunman may
kill a by-stander. On the other hand, surely the candy-store keeper in
the closed cinema fails in his action because his damage is too remote.
But the damage caused to the commercial traveller by gasoline rationing is neither too remote nor unforeseeable, and yet the government
cannot be expected to compensate him. Further criteria must be sought
in cases such as these: the test cannot be whether the act is legislative
in form, for there seems ·no reason why the determination that the
decision is rule-making rather than adjudicatory should affect the
rights of the injured citizen. The point is that individual well-being is
not in itself absolutely assured by any government, and that whenever
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private interest conflicts with public good, the former must be subordinated to the latter. The individual must pay for the privilege of living
in an ordered society. Rules must be framed which, in the light of
economic conditions, administrative needs and juristic considerations,
will determine when the citizen is paying too high a price. When he
su:ffers a bad bargain let him be compensated for his loss.
Here, then, is an important problem, and one to which no simple
and universal solution is applicable. Each fact situation calls for a
careful weighing in the balance of the public interest against that of
the individual, an estimation of the remoteness and foreseeability of the
damage, and an assessment of the expense and administrative difficulty
involved. Since it is impossible to categorize the circumstances when
these vague criteria are present, a detailed statute providing that in
certain prescribed cases the government shall be liable in tort seems
impracticable at the present time.
It is tempting to think the situation analogous to that where the
courts of Chancery worked out remedies for situations not covered by
the common law, and ultimately built up the system of Equity. Or
again, the continental handling of these issues can be looked at for
comparison. In France, the Conseil D'Etat, an administrative tribunal,
has jurisdiction over civil claims against the government, and has regularly awarded compensation to subjects injured by operations of the
government even though there was no fault. It is significant that that
tribunal has continually refused to lay down any :fixed principles, and
that the attempts made by French jurists such as Hauriou, Jeze, Duguit,
Berthelemy, Appleton and Waline to develop philosophical and juristic theories have led to no appreciable measure of agreement as to the
basis of liability. Just as Equity courts treated each case on its merits
in the early stages, so do the continental administrative tribunals dealing
with governmental liability. Because of the limitations imposed by the
doctrine of stare decisis, Anglo-American courts cannot even follow in
the path of the courts of Chancery unless they are given statutory
authority. Perhaps the most that should be done is that some general
statutory provision embodying only the broad principles outlined in the
previous paragraph should be passed.
A further query is outstanding: Should the courts entrusted with
the development of this new body of law be the ordinary courts? It
may be argued that the examples of Equity and droit administratif
point to the desirability of special courts untrammeled by private law
concepts being set up to work out these principles. If that contention
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is to be accepted, then the further point as to whether such a new court
is to have jurisdiction of all claims against the government must be
decided. In France, the original intention appears to have been that
the Conseil D'Etat should adjudicate on all claims in respect of injuries
inflicted by the government, yet, that having been found unworkable,
the doctrine of administrative trespass ( V oie de f ait) has been invoked
to empower the ordinary civil courts to adjudicate on claims against the
government where the protection of the rights and liberties of the
subject is in issue. 116 England and the United States would have to
decide whether .they were to entrust all civil claims against the government to a new court. If they did, the new court could hardly be
expected to follow the common law courts exactly, even on facts to
which a common law rule would be readily applicable. Inevitably, a
new and completely separate body of law for government claims cases,
a body of public law, in fact, not merely an extension in certain directions of private law, would· be built up. The alternative would be to
assign only cases under the new proposed statute to the administrative
court. This would be difficult to administer because the plaintiff would
frequently be uncertain whether the common law gave him a remedy.
Would he then have to lose a common law action before claiming a
separate relief in the administrative court? Furthermore, it is out of
harmony with the Rule of Law and Anglo-American legal tradition
to set up separate administrative courts to deal with matters normally
within the scope of the ordinary courts.
·
If, therefqre, the legislature were to recognize the need for an
extension of governmental liability, then it would seem best to entrust
to the ordinary courts the task of dealing with each case on its merits
by the application of the criteria suggested above. The problem is
complex, it admits of no ready solution, and the courts cannot be
· expected to work out any coherent doctrine for a long time. If an
enlightened legislature is willing to acknowledge these aspects of governmental liability, it must also let the courts handle these further
cases in an empirical fashion, and not ~omplain if a consistent body of
principles is not rapidly developed.
116
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